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I.

INTRODUCTION

In enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) l in 1980, Congress laid the

foundation for a major federal program designed to take on one of
America's most pervasive and dangerous environmental problems:
the cleanup of inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites.2 In
demonstrating its resolve to confront this environmental threat, Congress established a $1.6 billion "Superfund" to subsidize the cleanup
of the nation's most dangerous inactive and abandoned hazardous
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982))
[hereinafter CERCLA]. CERCLA is commonly referred to as "Superfund" or the "Superfund
Act."
2. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md.
1986).
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waste sites.3 Although in 1980 the allocation of $1.6 billion over a five
year period seemed an impressive expression of Congress's resolve,
the enormity of the hazardous waste problem4 quickly demonstrated
that the Superfund evoked a confidence that was soon to wither.
In 1984, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) estimated that up to $16 billion in federal funds were needed to
effectively deal with the national hazardous waste disposal problem. 6
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, however, estimated the total cost at over $100 billion. 7 To bridge the financial gap
between the amount of funds appropriated under CERCLA and the
3. Congress initially authorized $220 million of general revenues and $1.38 billion of
excise taxes on petroleum products and certain inorganic chemicals to fund the program. 42
U.S.C. § 9631(b) (1982). These appropriations financed the original Hazardous Substance
Response Trust Fund ("Superfund"), which Congress created to subsidize the cleanup costs of
hazardous waste sites when responsible polluters are unknown, unable, or unwilling to
compensate the government for expenses incurred to clean up such sites. If the party
responsible for releasing hazardous waste can be identified, then the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) may bring an action for damages to recover government funds expended for
cleanup response costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606 (1982). CERCLA also authorizes a private
right of action against parties within the purview of section 107(a). See, e.g., Walls v. Waste
Resource Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1785 (6th Cir. 1985); Artesian Water Co. v.
Government Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Del. 1985); Pinole Properties v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
4. The EPA estimates that 77.1 billion pounds of hazardous waste are produced each
year, 90% of which is disposed of in an environmentally unsound manner. H. REP. No. 1096,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119,
6124. As of June 1986, the EPA had inventoried over 24,000 uncontrolled hazardous waste
sites, many of which require emergency action because they pose an immediate threat to the
environment and the public health. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. HW-7.3, NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST
FACT BOOK 1 (1986). The cost of an average cleanup is approximately $12 million. Address
by Thomas M. McMahon, American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 11, 1986), quoted
in 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 563 (1986).
5. Moskowitz & Hoyt, Enforcement of CERCLA Against Innocent Owners of Property, 19
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1171 (1986). Reporting on the Superfund Revenue Act of 1985, the Senate
Committee on Finance commented:
It is now clear that the current Superfund program [CERCLA] will not be
adequate to achieve the goals of the 1980 Act. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimates that only 15 of the 538 sites now on the National
Priority List will be cleaned by September 30, 1985, and that the unobligated
balance of the Superfund will be less than $10 million on that date.
S. REP. No. 73, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985).
6. See $8.4 Billion to $16 Billion Needed to Clean Superfund Sites. EPA Paper Says, [14
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1715, 1725 (1984). Congress's General Accounting
Office challenged the reliability of the EPA's 1984 projection of cleanup costs because the
agency's projection did not include groundwater cleanup costs, which can run as high as $10.5
million per site, and because the EPA has little experience in cleaning up sites. Superfund
ProjectionsMay Not Be Reliable, Exclude Groundwater Cleanup Costs GAO Says, [14 Current
Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1943 (1984).
7. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRATEGY
(1985), reprinted in 9 CHEMICAL & RADIATION WASTE LITIGATION REP. 752 (1985).
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amount actually needed to clean up hazardous waste sites, the EPA
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have advocated expansive theories of CERCLA liability. 8
Perhaps sympathetic to the magnitude of the hazardous waste
crisis, courts have adopted expansive theories of liability advanced by
the EPA and the DOJ and have interpreted the vague liability provi-

sions of CERCLA broadly. Courts have held the scope of liability
imposed by CERCLA to include landowners not responsible for the
production or release of any hazardous waste. 9 One class of landowners placed in a particularly vulnerable position by CERCLA is the
banking industry. A federal district court has interpreted CERCLA
to hold a commercial lender, who becomes a landowner via foreclosure, strictly liable for cleanup costs incurred in the removal of hazardous substances from the land in its possession, even when the
lender played no part in producing, dumping, or releasing any such
substances on the land." ° Furthermore, the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), enacted on October 17,
1986,11 narrows the scope of affirmative defenses available to shield
innocent landowners from liability,I2 thereby increasing the likelihood
that courts will hold commercial lenders liable for hazardous waste
cleanup costs.

Because cleaning up hazardous waste sites can cost millions of
8. For example, although CERCLA does not contain any provisions that specifically
impose strict liability for hazardous waste releases, the DOJ has successfully argued that
landowners are strictly liable for the response costs the government incurs to remove
hazardous waste from their land. For a discussion of cases interpreting CERCLA liability
broadly, see infra notes 37, 39 & 57 and accompanying text. See, e.g., J.V. Peters & Co. v.
EPA, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,
Inc., No. 80-1274-6 (C.D.S.C. Aug. 14, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database, Dist file); United
States v. Northeast Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984),
aff'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 2376 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1986); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,
1113 (D.N.J. 1983). In addition, the Eighth Circuit, construing the scope of CERCLA
liability broadly, recently held that CERCLA retroactively applies to acts of hazardous waste
contamination occurring before its enactment and authorizes recovery of pre-enactment
cleanup costs. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 55 U.S.L.W. 2376
(8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1986).
9. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (owner of
land contaminated by hazardous waste released by prior owner strictly liable for government
expended response costs); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.
Md. 1986) (bank, which formerly held mortgage on land it later purchased at a foreclosure
sale, required to reimburse United States for cost of cleaning up hazardous waste even though
waste released by prior owner).
10. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
11. Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 101(35), 100 Stat. 1613, 1616-17 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West Supp. 1987)).
12. See Hayes & Mackerron, Superfund II: A New Mandate, Env't Rep., Feb. 13, 1987, at
29 (BNA Special Rep.).
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dollars,' 3 both state and federal agencies have an incentive to seek
cleanup cost reimbursement from "deep-pocketed" parties. This
strategy has made banks and other secured lenders targets of state and
federal agencies seeking reimbursement for environmental cleanup
costs. The purpose of this Comment is to survey the 1986 amendments affecting the liability of commercial lenders under CERCLA
and to evaluate the availability and effectiveness of possible affirmative defenses to such liability. Such an evaluation is undertaken by
synthesizing CERCLA, case law interpreting the scope of liability
under CERCLA, and the 1986 amendments altering CERCLA.
Additionally, this Comment will analyze, in light of CERCLA's
underlying policy goals, the soundness of imposing liability for
cleanup costs on commercial lenders who have taken no part in the
production or release of any hazardous substances.

II. CERCLA: A STATUTORY OVERVIEW
Responding to a growing public concern over inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites, Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980.14
CERCLA provided a five-year, $1.6 billion Superfund program to
subsidize the cleanup of hazardous waste sites that pose an immediate
danger to the public health or the environment.'" Essentially, the
goals of CERCLA are: (1) to facilitate cleanups when hazardous substances are released' 6 into the environment1 7 or when a release is
13. The amount of the EPA's costs to clean up hazardous waste sites depends upon what
actions the agency elects to take at a particular site. The cost of a "remedial" action, a shortterm or emergency response, is usually limited to $1 million. "Removal" actions usually are
long-term operations involving permanent remedies. The agency places sites that require
remedial action on the National Priority List. Generally, after a site has been recommended
for inclusion on the National Priority List, the EPA conducts a search for responsible parties
and a remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) to determine whether remedial actions
should be undertaken. On average, such RI/FS studies cost $875,000 per site. If, after
conducting an RI/FS study, the EPA concludes that remedial action is warranted, it conducts
another study to design a remedial action plan. Costs for "remedial design" studies average
$850,000 per site. The design is followed by remedial action averaging $8,600,000 per site.
Finally, upon completion of remedial action, "operation and maintenance" activities continue
at an average cost of $3,770,000 per site (the present value of operation and maintenance costs
for 30 years). Proposed Amendments to the National Oil and Hazardous Substance
Contingency Plan; the National Priorities List, 52 Fed. Reg. 2492 (proposed Jan. 22, 1987).
14. S.REP. No. 73, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985).
15. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982) (" '[R]elease' means any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing
into the environment ....
").
17. Section 9601(8) provides:
"[E]nvironment" means (A) the navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous
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threatened; and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of
these cleanups. 18 The Act provides the federal government with two
basic means of achieving these goals. Either the EPA can use
Superfund funds to finance the cleanup of hazardous waste facilities' 9
and subsequently bring civil actions against responsible parties to
recover the costs of such cleanups; 20 or, the EPA can require a
responsible person 21 to remove released hazardous substances from a
facility.
Section 107(a)2 2 of CERCLA creates a broad net of liability that
zone, and the ocean waters of which the natural resources are under the exclusive
management authority of the United States under the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act [16 U.S.C.A. § 1801 et seq.], and (B) any
other surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or
subsurface strata, or ambient air within the United States or under the
jurisdiction of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(8) (1982) (brackets in original).
18. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038.

19. Section 9601(9) provides:
"[Flacility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe, or
pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor
vehicle, rolling stock or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to
be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any
vessel ....
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1982).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982) [hereinafter section 107(a)].
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982) (" '[P]erson' means an individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States
Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body.").
22. Section 107(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-(1) the owner and operator of
a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such
person, by any party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party
or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person who
accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release,
or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for-(A) all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government or a State not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
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enables the government to recover hazardous substance response 23
costs from "responsible parties." 2 4 Under this section, parties can be
held responsible for the release of hazardous substances irrespective of
fault. Section 107(a) extends liability to four categories of persons:
(1) current owners or operators of hazardous substance facilities;
(2) past owners or operators of hazardous substance facilities at the
time of disposal; (3) persons who arrange for treatment or disposal of
hazardous substances at the facility; and (4) persons who transport
hazardous substances to a site from which there is a release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance.
Congress intended the scope of liability under section 107(a) of
CERCLA to be far-reaching.2 6 In its zeal to respond to a national
hazardous waste problem threatening both public health and the environment, Congress drafted section 107(a) as a "broad response and
liability mechanism" 27 to facilitate the expeditious cleanup of toxic
pollution and to impose liability on those parties responsible for producing such pollution. Section 107(a)'s expansive web of liability,
however, catches not only parties responsible for releasing hazardous
substances, but also innocent parties who acquire land subsequent to a
hazardous substance release.28
To ameliorate the expansive breadth of liability under section
107(a) and to protect these innocent parties, Congress provided three
affirmative defenses in section 107(b) of the Act. Sections 107(b)(1)
and (2) exempt from liability those otherwise liable under section
107(a) who can establish that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance was caused solely by (1) an act of God or (2) an act
of war. Because acts of God and acts of war are rarely the sole cause
of an actual or threatened hazardous waste release, the most practicathe reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1982) (" '[R]espond' or 'response' means remove, removal,
remedy, and remedial action.").
24. Responsible parties are those parties liable for response costs under section 107(a). See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
26. Liability for response costs under CERCLA is "strict joint and several." Liability
may be imposed irrespective of fault, and any responsible party can be held liable for the entire
cost of the cleanup "even if that party's contribution to the waste site was minimal." H.R.
REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 15 (1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3038, 3038.
27. See EPA, PROJECT SUMMARY, COST OF REMEDIAL RESPONSE ACTION AT
UNCONTROLLED HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES, H.R. Doc. No. 93, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 71
(1983).
28. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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ble of the section 107(b) defenses is the "third party," or "innocent
landowner," defense of section 107(b)(3). This defense allows defendants to escape liability if they can establish that the release or
threatened release at issue was caused solely by a third party who

neither is an agent or employee of the defendant, nor is engaged in a
contractual relationship with the defendant.2 9 Thus, section 107(b)(3)
carves out an exception from section 107(a) liability when defendants
can establish a complete lack of a causal nexus between their actions,
or inactions, and the actual or threatened hazardous waste release at
issue.

30

The juxtaposition of sections 107(a) and 107(b) manifests the
conflicting policy concerns inherent in CERCLA: the need for effective and expeditious cleanup of hazardous waste sites to protect public
health and the environment, and the need to protect the interests and
legal rights of those innocent parties who may be held liable for such
cleanups. 3 At the heart of these competing policy concerns are complex legal issues which have spawned litigation concerning the magnitude of section 107(b)(3)'s narrowing effect on the scope of CERCLA
29. Section 107(b)(3) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a
contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant ... if
the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised
due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable
acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,
§ 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1982).
30. If lenders, however, become entangled with the operational affairs of a facility, in
protecting their security interest, they may be found strictly liable under CERCLA as either an
"owner or operator" of the facility. See § 107(a)(1).
31. See H. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 15 (1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3038. The need to administer effective and expeditious
cleanups of hazardous waste is so compelling that Congress, through its legislative function,
and the judiciary, through its interpretive function, have concomitantly imposed strict liability
on landowners whose property contains an actual or threatened hazardous waste release.
Although this scheme of liability requires nonpolluters to clean up or reimburse the
government for cleaning up the hazardous waste releases of others, the magnitude of the
hazardous waste crisis is deemed severe enough to justify the imposition of strict liability on a
potentially innocent class of nonpolluters. Such a result-oriented scheme is inconsistent with
precepts of fundamental fairness and threatens to encroach upon the interests and legal rights
of those innocent parties who may be found liable under CERCLA.
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liability under section 107(a)(1). 32 The availability of the section
107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense largely determines 33 whether
can escape the broad reach of liability under section
such landowners
34
107(a)(1).

III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION

107(a)

CERCLA is a particularly difficult statute for the judiciary to

interpret because ambiguities and material omissions often obfuscate
the intended meaning of its provisions, 35 and because few committee
reports are available to clarify legislative intent.3 6 In United States v.

Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.,37 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri identified the
ramifications of CERCLA's lack of clarity:
CERCLA, although nicknamed "the Superfund," is not the ultimate tool in dealing with the problems associated with inactive or
abandoned hazardous waste sites as initially intended by its sponsors. CERCLA is in fact a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions....
[N]umerous important features were deleted during the closing
hours of the Congressional session. The courts are once again
placed in the undesirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation. 8
Two key provisions in CERCLA marred by vague terminology are
the liability provision in section 107(a)(1) and the innocent landowner
32. Id.
33. In addition to section 107(b)(3)'s affirmative defense, a landowner can seek to escape
section 107(a)(1) liability by way of section 101(20)(A), which narrows the definition of
"owner or operator" to exclude persons who, without participating in the management of a
facility, hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect their security interest. Section
101(20)(A) provides:
"[O]wner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning,
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore
facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and
(iii) in the case of any abandoned facility, any person who owned, operated, or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately prior to such
abandonment. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating
in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A) (1982).
34. See supra note 22.
35. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
36. For a discussion of the legislative history of CERCLA, see generally H. REP. No.
1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,at 1 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6119.

37. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
38. Id. at 838, 839 n.15 (citations omitted).
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affirmative defense in section 107(b)(3). In several principal cases
decided prior to the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the judiciary
struggled to interpret these provisions.
A.

New York v. Shore Realty Corp.

In New York v. Shore Realty Corp., the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found an owner of contaminated property, on
which a prior owner had released hazardous waste, liable for government expended response costs." In Shore Realty, the state of New
York brought suit against Shore Realty Corp. (Shore) and Donald
LeoGrande, a Shore officer and stockholder, seeking reimbursement
for government costs incurred in cleaning up a hazardous substance
disposal site in Glenwood Landing, New York. Shore acquired the
land for development purposes even though one of its officers,
LeoGrande, knew that hazardous waste was stored on the property.
Although neither Shore nor LeoGrande were responsible for any of
the nearly 700,000 gallons of hazardous waste located on the property, New York brought suit under CERCLA seeking injunctive relief
and damages.41 The trial court granted New York's motion for partial summary judgment, found the defendants liable for New York's
response costs, and required them to clean up the hazardous waste on
the property. 42 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision.43
At trial, the defendants argued that they were not within the purview of section 107(a) because they neither owned the Glenwood
Landing site at the time of disposal nor caused the release of the hazardous waste at the facility. 4" Shore argued that the court should
limit the applicability of sections 107(a)(1) and (a)(2) to persons owning or operating a facility "at the time of disposal."45 Shore further
argued that both subsections require a showing of a causal connection
between the actions of the defendant and the hazardous waste release
at issue. The Second Circuit disagreed, finding that section 107(a)(1)
"unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility from which there is a release or threat of release, without regard to
causation. '46
39. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
40. Id. at 1043-44.
41. Id. at 1037.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 1043.
45. Id. at 1044. This argument calls for the court to adopt the notion that culpability for
releasing hazardous waste should not attach to the title of the property and transfer every time

ownership changes hands.
46. Id.
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Shore also tried to escape section 107(a)(1) liability by asserting
the section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense, claiming that it was
not involved in transporting any hazardous substances to the site and
that it exercised due care after taking control of the site.4 7 The court
again disagreed, finding that the defendants could not avail themselves of the section 107(b)(3) affirmative defense because: (1) at the
time of Shore's acquisition of the property, LeoGrande knew that
hazardous waste was stored on the site;4 (2) Shore knew of the previous owner's activities on the land and could have readily ascertained
49
that the previous owners would continue to dump waste at the site;
and (3) Shore appeared to have a contractual relationship with the
previous owners of the site that effectually precluded it from raising
the innocent landowner defense.5 0
The notion of strict liability implicit in section 107(a)(1) makes
an owner or operator of a facility liable for hazardous waste response
costs even in the absence of a showing of causation. Section
107(b)(3), however, carves out an exception to the strict liability
imposed in section 107(a)(1), which is, ironically, based on causation.
Because strict liability requires no showing of fault or causation, the
innocent landowner exception to the liability imposed under section
107(a)(1) perhaps evinces Congress's intention to exempt from liability consummately innocent landowners who neither have contractual
ties to responsible parties,"1 nor have any actual or constructive
knowledge of the presence of hazardous waste on a facility at the time
2
of its acquisition.
The Shore court's imposition of strict liability on owners or operators of land containing an actual or threatened hazardous waste
release creates, in effect, a presumption of liability on parties within
the purview of section 107(a)(1). To rebut this presumption and
escape liability, innocent landowners must either prove that they fall
47. Id. at 1048.
48. Id. at 1037.
49. The court reasoned that because Shore could have readily foreseen that the tenants on
the property would continue to dump hazardous waste at the site, the releases at the site were
not caused solely by the activities of the tenants Id. at 1049.
50. Id.
51. Before defendants can escape liability via section 107(b)(3), they must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the release at issue was caused solely by a third party.
Consequently, before one defendant can be exonerated from liability via section 107(b)(3),
another party must first be implicated. Thus, under the statutory construction of the innocent
landowner defense, some party will remain liable for the cost of cleaning up the hazardous
waste release at issue.
52. If a landowner has actual or constructive notice of the presence of hazardous waste on
a facility when he acquires the facility, the landowner is precluded from raising the section
107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense. See infra notes 90, 93 and accompanying text.
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outside the parameters of section 107(a)(1), 53 or prove that they are
shielded from section 107(a)(1) liability by section 107(b)(3)'s innocent landowner affirmative defense. 54
B.

United States v. Mirabile

Section 101(20)(A)"I of CERCLA restricts the purview of section
107(a)(1) 5 6 by defining the term "owner or operator of a facility" narrowly. Under section 101(20)(A), a holder of a mere security interest
in property may be exempt from liability for hazardous waste releases.
In United States v. Mirabile," a federal district court construed section 101(20)(A) as exempting certain secured lenders from liability for
hazardous waste response costs when such lenders hold merely a
security interest in the property where a release has occurred or
threatens to occur. The court interpreted the exemption language in
section 101(20)(A) as suggesting that as long as a secured creditor
does not become "overly entangled" in the affairs of the owner of the
facility, the creditor cannot be held liable for cleanup costs.5 8 Thus,
when the government brings an action against a secured creditor to
recover funds expended to clean up a hazardous waste release, the
issue becomes how far a secured lender can go to protect its financial
interest before courts will find that it acted within the meaning of
"owner or operator of a facility" under section 101(20)(A).
In Mirabile, the United States brought a civil action to recover
costs incurred in removing alleged hazardous substances from land
owned by defendants Anna and Thomas Mirabile.5 9 The Mirabile's
land had been contaminated by a previous owner, Turco Coatings,
Inc. (Turco), who was operating a paint manufacturing business on
the site. The Mirabiles joined American Bank and Trust Co. (ABT)
as a third party defendant, claiming ABT had become liable for the
creation of the hazardous condition at the Turco site by virtue of its
financial dealings with Turco. Turco had taken out a loan with ABT
to purchase the land on which it erected its paint manufacturing facil53. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
54. Although the existence of the section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner affirmative defense
makes the presumption of liability under section 107(a)(l) a rebuttable one, the burden of
meeting the conditions of section 107(b)(3) is so severe that the loophole created by the defense
to protect innocent landowners is indeed a narrow one.
55. See supra note 33.
56. See supra note 22.
57. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,994 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
58. Id. at 20,995.
59. Id. at 20,994.
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ity. When Turco defaulted on its loan, ABT purchased the site at a
foreclosure sale and, shortly thereafter, sold the site to the Mirabiles.
After being joined as a third party defendant, ABT filed a motion
for summary judgment asserting two grounds. First, ABT contended
that when it purchased the site at the foreclosure sale it received only
equitable, not legal, title to the property because it expeditiously
assigned its bid for the property to the Mirabiles, who then actually
purchased the land.60 Consequently, ABT asserted that since it
never acquired legal ownership of the Turco site, it was not a liable
"owner" within the purview of section 107(a)(1). Second, ABT
argued that any activity it undertook at the site while holding equitable title was merely to protect its security interest, and that it never
participated in the management of the property. Accordingly, ABT
asserted it was also not liable as an "operator" within the scope of
section 107(a)(1).61

The court found it unnecessary to address ABT's first argument
concerning equitable versus legal title, because it granted ABT's
motion for summary judgment based solely on the second argument. 62
The court found that regardless of the nature of title ABT received,
its actions after foreclosure were undertaken merely to protect its
security interest in the property and did not constitute an attempt to
participate in the management of the site.6 3 Construing the scope of
section 107(a)(1) narrowly, the court stated:
[I]n enacting CERCLA Congress manifested its intent to impose
liability upon those who were responsible for and profited from
improper disposal practices. Thus, it would appear that before a
secured creditor such as ABT may be held liable, it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site.
In the instant case, ABT merely foreclosed on the property after all
60. Id. at 20,996.
61. Id.
62. Id.

63. Id. Although the court never directly addressed the question of whether ABT was an
actual owner under section 107(a)(l), it can be inferred that the court did not view ABT as an

owner despite the fact that ABT foreclosed on the Turco site, because the court restricted its
analysis to the question of whether ABT was an "operator" under section 101(20)(A). By
disregarding ABT's first argument concerning equitable versus legal title and essentially
ignoring the term "owner" in section 107(a)(1), the Mirabile court focused exclusively on

whether ABT was an "operator" within the parameters of section 101(20)(A), which would
make ABT strictly liable under section 107(a)(1). The court determined that ABT had not
acted as an "operator" of the Turco site and was therefore not liable under section 107(a)(1).
Id. It is important to note that if the Mirabile court found that ABT was an "owner" of the
Turco site, the court's "operator" analysis would have been unnecessary as ABT would have
been liable under section 107(a)(l) as an "owner" of a facility where hazardous waste had been
released. Unfortunately, the court in Mirabilegave no hint of its rationale for ignoring ABT's
legal versus equitable title argument.
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operations had ceased and thereafter took prudent and6 4routine
steps to secure the property against further depreciation.

In essence, the Mirabile court found that section 101(20)(A)'s definition of "owner or operator" narrows the scope of section 107(a)(1) so
as to exclude from liability a person who, "without participating in
the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. "65
C.

United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.

In Shore Realty, the court broadly interpreted section 107(a)(1)
as imposing strict liability on current owners and operators of facilities from which hazardous substances have been or threaten to
be released.6 6

But in Mirabile,6 7 the court interpreted section

101(20)(A),68

which defines "owner or operator" narrowly, so as to
limit the liability under section 107(a)(1). In 1986, however, in
UnitedStates v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. ,69 a federal district court
interpreted section 101(20)(A) as limiting the scope of liability under
section 107(a) only when a defendant, at the time of a cleanup, holds
merely a security interest in the facility. If the defendant is an actual
owner or operator of the facility at the time of a hazardous waste
cleanup, section 101(20)(A) has no narrowing effect on section
107(a)(1). 70
In Maryland Bank & Trust, the United States brought a civil
action against the Maryland Bank and Trust Co. (MBT) to recover
funds expended by the EPA for the removal of hazardous substances
from a 117 acre farm owned by MBT since 1982."' The previous
owners of the farm, Herschel and Nellie McLeod, had operated a
trash and garbage business on the land and, in 1973, permitted the
dumping of hazardous waste thereon.7 2 In 1980, the McLeods' son,
Mark, applied for and received a loan from MBT to purchase the
farm from his parents. After Mark failed to make payments on the
loan, MBT instituted a foreclosure action and subsequently purchased
the land at a foreclosure sale in 1982.73
64. Id.

65. Id.
66. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
67. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).

68. See supra note 33.
69. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).

70. Id. at 579.
71. Id. at 575-76.
72. Id. at 575.

73. Id.
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In 1983, the EPA undertook a hazardous waste removal action
under CERCLA to facilitate the cleanup of the site.74 The EPA
notified the president of MBT that the agency would use EPA funds
to conduct its own cleanup if MBT did not take corrective action on
the site before October 24, 1983. After MBT declined to institute its
own cleanup, the EPA removed 237 drums of chemical material and
1,180 tons of contaminated soil from the land at a cost of over
$500,000. The EPA then requested compensation from MBT for
these cleanup costs. Upon MBT's failure to comply, the United
States initiated a civil action against MBT. 75 Both parties moved for
summary judgment.
MBT raised two principal defenses to the government's action.
First, MBT asserted it was not an owner or operator within the scope
of sections 107(a)(1) and 101(20)(A) 76 because, as the former mortgagee of the property, it purchased the property at a foreclosure sale
solely to protect its security interest in the land. This argument is
similar to the one ABT raised successfully in Mirabile. 7 Contrary
to the court's ruling in Mirabile, however, the court in Maryland
Bank & Trust found MBT, as a current legal owner of the facility at
the time EPA brought suit, liable under section 107(a)(1) for govern78
ment incurred response costs.
The difference between the two cases is that in Mirabile, ABT
owned the land at issue for only four months, whereas MBT held title
to the property, after purchasing it at the foreclosure sale, for nearly
four years.79 The court in Maryland Bank & Trust therefore held
that "current ownership of a facility alone brings a party within the
ambit of subsection (1) [of section 107(a)]."" ° MBT, as the owner of
the facility since 1982, fell within the purview of section 107(a)(1) and
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 576-80.
See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
See Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579 n.5.

It is unclear in Mirabile

whether ABT ever actually held legal title to the Turco site. If it did not, then Mirabile is
easily distinguished from Maryland Bank & Trust because the former is a section 107(a)(1)

"operator" case, while the latter is a section 107(a)(1) "owner" case. If in Mirabile, however,

ABT did actually hold legal title to the Turco site, even if for only four months, then
distinguishing the two cases becomes much more dubious. The only distinction then may be
the amount of time the defendant lender in each case actually owned the facility at issue.

79. See id. at 582.
80. Finding that MBT did not fall within the purview of the exemption language of section

101(20)(A), the court stated:
The exemption of subsection [101] (20)(A) covers only those persons who, at
the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security
interest in the land. The security interest must exist at the time of the clean-up.
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was therefore strictly liable for the response costs the government
incurred to clean up the facility. For this reason, the court granted
the government's motion
for summary judgment regarding liability
8 1
107(a)(1).
section
under
MBT raised the innocent landowner affirmative defense of section 107(b)(3) as a second attack against the government's claim. The
government responded with a two-pronged attack on the merits of
that defense. First, it argued that MBT's contractual relationship
with Herschel McLeod precluded it from availing itself of the innocent landowner defense.82 Second, the government argued that even
assuming arguendo that MBT passed the contractual relationship
hurdle, it could not prove that it exercised reasonable care concerning
the hazardous waste on the site; nor could MBT prove it took precautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of third parties. The
court, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the section 107(b)(3) issue, denied the government's motion chal83
lenging the adequacy of the innocent landowner defense.
Maryland Bank & Trust is important for two reasons. First, it
establishes that a secured lender who forecloses on property subject to
an actual or threatened release of hazardous waste may be strictly
liable for response costs expended by the EPA. Second, the decision
serves as a warning to secured lenders that if they do not carefully
investigate and monitor their landed security interests, they may find
themselves repeatedly paying for the pollution sins of others.84
The courts in Mirabile, Shore Realty, and Maryland Bank &
The mortgage held by MB & T (the security interest) terminated at the
foreclosure sale of May 15, 1982, at which time it ripened into full title.

MB & T purchased the property at the foreclosure sale not to protect its
security interest, but to protect its investment. Only during the life of the
mortgage did MB & T hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security

interest in the land. Under the law of Maryland (and twelve other states), the
mortgagee-financial institution actually holds title to the property while the

mortgage is in force. Congress intended by this exception [section 101(20)(A)] to
exclude these common law title mortgagees from the definition of "owner" since

title was in their hands only by operation of the common law. The exclusion
does not apply to former mortgagees currently holding title after purchasing the

property at a foreclosure sale, at least when, as here, the former mortgagee has
held title for nearly four years, and a full year before the EPA clean-up.

Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
81. Id.

82. Id. at 581.
83. Id. at 582.
84. See Brandt, Contaminated Collateral: A New Subspecialty, Am. Law., Oct. 1986, at

10, col. 1.
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Trust have been in the "undesirable and onerous position" 5 of interpreting CERCLA's morass of vague statutory language. The
Mirabile court interpreted the definition of "owner or operator" in
section 101(20)(A) narrowly, limiting the scope of section 107(a)(1)
liability to exclude defendants merely holding a security interest in a
facility at the time hazardous substances are disposed. The court in
Shore Realty, however, construed the definition of "owner or operator" broadly and held the current owner of a contaminated facility
liable under section 107(a)(1), irrespective of whether the defendant
actually owned the facility at the time of disposal. In Maryland
Bank & Trust, the court held that a bank owning a facility containing
an actual or threatened hazardous waste release is liable under section
107(a)(1), regardless of whether it contributed to such release.
Mirabile,Shore Realty, and MarylandBank & Trust all represent
judicial attempts to define the breadth of CERCLA liability. Yet,
despite these judicial attempts to clarify some of CERCLA's statutory
language, the availability and effectiveness of the section 107(b)(3)
innocent landowner defense, as well as the definition of "owner or
operator" under section 101(20)(A), remain unclear. How should
"contractual relationship" be defined under section 107(b)(3)? Does
a deed or land contract with another party constitute a "contractual
relationship"? How should "due diligence" or "having reason to
know" be defined? Congress attempted to address these questions,
among others, when it drafted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986.86
IV.

THE

1986 SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION ACT: AN
ATTEMPT AT LEGISLATIVE CLARITY

Authorization for the Superfund expired on September 30, 1985.
Although the primary motive for passing the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) was to replenish the coffers
of the Superfund, Congress also revised, expanded, and clarified many
of CERCLA's provisions,87 including the innocent landowner affirmative defense in section 107(b)(3). Although the liability provisions in
section 107(a) were essentially unchanged by the 1986 amendments,"
85. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,
838, 839 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 2366 (8th Cir. Dec. 31, 1986).
86. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 101(35), 100 Stat. 1613, 1616-17 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West Supp. 1987)).

87. For a legislative summary of SARA and its impact on CERCLA, see generally Hayes
& Mackerron, supra note 12.
88. One material change the 1986 amendments made to section 107 is the addition of the
federal lien provision in new section 107(1). This provision provides that all costs and damages
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Congress added newly defined terms to section 101 of CERCLA to
clarify the vague statutory language in 107(a)(1).19 Consequently,
the 1986 amendments affect both the scope of liability under CERCLA and the availability of the innocent landowner affirmative
defense.
Section 101(35)(A) 9 ° of the 1986 Act defines the meaning of the
term "contractual relationship" for the purpose of the section
107(b)(3) defense. Under section 101(35)(A), 9 1 a contractual relationship includes, inter alia, land contracts, deeds, or other instruments transferring title or possession. Section 107(b)(3) 92 states that a
defendant in a "contractual relationship" with a third party responsifor which a person is liable to the United States under section 107(a) shall constitute a lien in
favor of the United States upon all real property and rights to such property that belong to
such person and "are subject to or affected by a removal or remedial action." H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986). The purpose of this provision is to ensure that
landowners whose land was cleaned up with Superfund dollars are not able to reap windfall
profits from selling their decontaminated property. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, at 17 (1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038, 3040. In
addition, an increasing number of states have adopted, as part of their state hazardous waste
regulatory schemes, provisions granting state officials the authority to conduct cleanups of
contaminated land and then levy a "superlien" against the responsible party. Such a lien is
levied on real or personal property and takes priority over all other liens or interests in the
property. See Note, Federal & State Remedies To Clean Up Hazardous Waste Sites, 20 U.
RICH. L. REV. 400 (1986). Thus, by preempting secured lenders' security interests in
mortgaged property, state "superlien" provisions portend another impending escalation in
lender liability due to expanding hazardous waste regulatory schemes. For a discussion of the
interaction of Florida and federal statutes regulating the cleanup of hazardous waste, see Note,
Hazardous Waste and the Innocent Purchaser,38 U. FLA. L. REV. 253, 258-60 (1986).
89. See infra note 90.
90. Section 101(35)(A) of the 1986 Act provides:
The term 'contractual relationship' for the purpose of section 107(b)(3),
includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other instruments
transferring title of possession, unless the real property on which the facility
concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or
placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more
of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know
and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of
the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by escheat,
or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise
of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has
satisfied the requirements of section 107(b)(3) (a) and (b).
Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(35)(A), 100 Stat. 1613, 1616 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601
(West Supp. 1987)).
91. Id.
92. See supra note 29.
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ble for an actual or threatened release of hazardous substances is precluded from raising the innocent landowner defense. Section
101(35)(A) of the 1986 Act, however, provides a statutory exception
to the definition of "contractual relationship" if the defendant
acquired the facility at issue after the disposal of hazardous substances occurred and if, at the time he acquired the facility, the
defendant did not know and had no reason to know9 3 of the disposal
of any hazardous substances at the facility. In addition, in order to
avail oneself to the innocent landowner affirmative defense, a defendant must satisfy the requirements of section 107(b)(3)(a) and (b) by
establishing that, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance, and took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions by third parties.94
The practical effect of section 101(35)(A)'s definition of "contractual relationship" is to create a trapdoor through which truly
innocent landowners can escape section 107(a)(1) liability by asserting
a section 107(b)(3) defense. Where third parties acquire land after
hazardous substances have been released, section 101(35)(A) limits
the availability of the innocent landowner defense by establishing that
all deeds and land sale contracts transferring either title or possession
are, in effect, presumed "contractual relationships" unless the defend93. For the purpose of section 107(b)(3), section 101(35)(B) describes the duty of inquiry
of potential land purchasers as follows:
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in
clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have
undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of property consistent with good commercial or customary
practice in an effort to minimize liability. For the purposes of the preceding
sentence the court shall take into account any specialized knowledge or
experience on part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the
value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or reasonably
ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of the presence or
likely presence of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such
contamination by appropriate inspection.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 262, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986). The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 Conference Report states that the purpose of section 101(35) is to
eliminate liability under section 107(a)(1) for landowners who acquire real property after hazardous substances have been deposited thereon, and who, despite their exercise of due care
regarding the discovery of such materials, remain ignorant of the presence of hazardous substances on the land. The Conference Report also makes it clear that "those engaged in commercial transactions should . . . be held to a higher standard [of inquiry] than those who are
engaged in private residential transactions." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
187 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3275, 3280.
94. See generally §§ 107(b)(3), 101(35)(A). Under section 107(b)(3), the only way a lender
can avail himself of the innocent landowner affirmative defense is to have acquired land after it
has been contaminated without any actual or constructive knowledge of hazardous substances
present, and after fulfilling the stringent duty of inquiry established under sections 101(35)(A)

& (B).
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ant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence the necessary
conditions to rebut the presumption. 95 Failure to rebut this presumption will preclude a defendant from asserting a section 107(b)(3)
affirmative defense. 96 Furthermore, section 101(35)(C) 97 of the 1986

Act establishes that a defendant who, after acquiring ownership of a
facility, obtains actual or constructive notice of a real or threatened
release of hazardous substances on the facility, and subsequently
transfers ownership to another person without disclosing such knowledge, shall be liable under section 107(a)(1) 98 and shall forfeit any
right to raise a section 107(b)(3) defense. 99

The synergistic effect of sections 101(35)(A), (B), and (C) is to
drastically restrict the availability of the innocent landowner defense
in section 107(b)(3).t0° Whether such landowners contributed in any
way to an actual or threatened release becomes irrelevant if they
acquired their facility with either actual or constructive notice of such
a release.' 1 In light of the stringent duty of inquiry 102 imposed by
section 101(35)(A) and (B) on those who acquire land, it will be near
futile for an innocent landowner liable under section 107(a)(1) to
attempt to3 escape liability via section 107(b)(3)'s innocent landowner
0
defense.'
95. Because all land transfer transactions presume contractual relationships, purchasers of
land containing an actual or threatening hazardous waste release are precluded from using the

section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense unless their acquisition of the property in issue
was within the narrow exceptions to the contractual relationship presumptions enumerated in
section 101(35)(A). Alternatively, landowners may try to escape liability under section
107(a)(l) by asserting that they held merely an indicia of ownership primarily to protect their
security interest in the facility at issue. See supra notes 33, 90 and accompanying text.

96. See supra notes 29, 90 & 93.
97. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
§ 101(35)(C), 100 Stat. 1613, 1617 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 (West Supp. 1987)).

98. Id.
99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See Hayes & MacKerron, supra note 12.
See supra note 90.
See supra note 93.
To protect their security intersts to the extent necessary to effectively avoid CERCLA

liability under section 107(a), lenders will have to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that after meeting a strict duty of inquiry requirement, they do not know, nor have any reason
to know, of any actual or threatened hazardous substance release on land they either own or
operate. To provide an expeditious, nonlitigious remedy to innocent landowners charged with

liability under section 107(a), however, Congress included in the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 a new "de minimis settlements" provision in section 122(g). This

provision provides that whenever practicable and in the public interest, the President shall as
promptly as possible reach a settlement with a potentially liable party if such settlement
involves only a minor portion of the response costs at the facility concerned. This settlement
procedure is not available as a matter of right, but is only available at the discretion of the
President who retains the authority to allocate total response costs among potentially
responsible parties as he deems appropriate. The mutual incentive of parties to settle, rather
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1986

The amended Superfund Act places commercial lenders in a vulnerable position because when commercial lenders make loans to land
purchasers, they usually retain a security interest in the land as collateral. This security interest allows the lender, in the event the borrower defaults, to recoup its loss by foreclosing on the mortgaged
property and reselling it. Because foreclosures are a regular part of
the commercial lending industry, lenders frequently find themselves,
even if only temporarily, as landowners strictly liable for hazardous
waste response costs under section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA.
In the sphere of banker liability imposed by section 107(a)(1), the
definition of "contractual relationship" in section 101(35) of the 1986
Act changes both the analysis and the threshold test in the determination of the availability of section 107(b)(3) as an affirmative defense.
Under section 101(35), the focus of the judicial inquiry shifts from an
assessment of causation' °4 to an assessment of actual and constructive
notice.' 015 Because section 101(35)(B) places a strict duty upon
secured lenders to make all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of the property, consistent with good commercial
practice, 10 6 it becomes extremely difficult for secured lenders to overcome the constructive notice hurdle and take advantage of the innocent landowner defense.
In terms of sections 107(a) and 107(b)(3), commercial lenders are
caught in a quandary. If they foreclose on property on which hazardous substances have been disposed and they acquire the property with
knowledge of such disposal, they are liable for response costs under
section 107(a)(1). If they have no knowledge of hazardous subthan litigate, environmental response cost disputes is twofold. First, parties avoid the high
costs of litigation; and second, parties can resolve their disputes in a more expeditious manner.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1986). Several commentators have
emphasized, however, that political disincentives exist that deter the resolution of hazardous
waste liability disputes through negotiation. One commentator has noted, "pressure for body
counts (number of cases filed) and a showing of toughness, or an unwillingness to negotiate
with polluters for fear that such negotiation will result in a trip before a Congressional
committee, has paralyzed the [EPA negotiation] system." Friedman, CorporateEnvironmental
Programsand Litigation: The Role of Lawyer-Managers in Environmental Litigation, 45 PUB.
ADMIN. L. REV. 768 (1985). For further discussion of how EPA officials under intense
political pressure have little incentive to negotiate, see Anderson, Negotiation and Informal
Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE L.J. 261.
104. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
105. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
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stances on the land, they will probably still be liable because the duty
of inquiry,"°" imposed on those acquiring property, suggests that they
should have known.10 8 Finally, if the secured lender exercises due
care in protecting and inspecting its security interest and discovers the
mortgagor has been dumping hazardous waste on the land, the
secured lender loses his right to raise a section 107(b)(3) defense
because the lender has acquired actual notice of the presence of hazardous waste. Moreover, courts will likely find lenders who acquire
ownership of contaminated land through foreclosure strictly liable for
the response costs incurred in cleaning up the land,"0 9 and these lenders will have little chance of escaping liability under the section
107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense."'
VI.

LENDERS' LIABILITY UNDER THE AMENDED SUPERFUND
ACT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

A.

Economic Ramifications

The broad scope of liability the amended Superfund Act imposes
on the banking industry compels the need for lenders to take special
precautions when making loans to land purchasers.'' These precautions include environmental audits of land, soil samples, monitoring
of land usage, and pre-acquisition investigation of the ownership and
usage history of the property. 2 A lender may also find it prudent to
include in loan agreements restrictions on the mortgagor's handling of
hazardous substances on the land." 3 These precautions are primarily preventive in nature and would be taken by a lender to protect
himself from liability for response costs under CERCLA." 4
107. Id.
108. Although section 101(35)(B) contains a "reason to know" test, the stringent duty of
inquiry imposed by section 101(35)(B) will transform this test, through application, into a
"should have known" test. The practical result of this transformation is a stricter threshold
test, which presupposes that persons who purchase land either know or should know whether
hazardous substances are present. Such a presumption approaches the view that when it
comes to an actual or threatened hazardous waste release, there is no such thing as an
"innocent landowner."
109. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
110. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
111. See Cohen, Hazardous Waste: A Threat to the Lender's Environment, 19 U.C.C. L.J.
127 (1986).
112. Id. at 124-25; see also Brandt, supra note 84, at 10, col. 4.
113. See Brandt, supra note 84, at 10, col. 4. A bank may undertake all of the
precautionary measures listed above and still be held liable under CERCLA for response costs.
Thus, even increasing expenditures on precautionary measures to prevent the disposal of
hazardous waste on lenders' security interests will not insure lenders against CERCLA
liability.
114. Precautionary measures taken by a bank to prevent the disposal of hazardous
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Although banks would implement these precautions to save
money by protecting themselves from liability, these preventive measures become part of a lender's cost of lending capital. These increased
costs can either be absorbed by lenders or passed on to borrowers in
the form of higher interest rates or increased transaction
costs. Inevitably, at least some portion of these costs will be passed
on to borrowers."I5 Such an increase in the cost of capital can cause
the demand for capital to decline."I6
When an increase in the cost of capital results in a decline in the
demand for capital, economic growth may be stymied by the subsequent decline in investment."l 7 Depressed levels of investment generally contribute to decreases in housing and other construction, a
reduction in the number of new businesses, potential increases in
unemployment, and a general decline in the aggregate level of spending. 118 Although a slight increase in the cost of investment capital
may not singularly cause a recession, its depressing economic effects
are felt at all levels of society." 9 Thus, when assessing the economic
implications of lender liability under CERCLA, it is important to
remain cognizant of all the economic ripples in the pond caused by a
rise in the cost of capital.
substances on its landed security interest merely demonstrate the exercise of due diligence.
After acting diligently and in accordance with good commercial practice, a bank, to avail itself
of the innocent landowner defense, must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it
neither knew nor had reason to know of an actual or threatened hazardous substance release.
Because of the strict duty of inquiry imposed on commercial land purchasers, however,
commercial lenders are faced with an almost insurmountable burden of showing they had "no
reason to know."
115. In all likelihood, commercial lenders will respond to the increased risks of CERCLA
liability by increasing the cost of capital. Lenders may apportion this increase broadly among
all borrowers, or specifically among borrowers who have the highest propensity to become
entangled with CERCLA liability. Query, however, whether it is possible for a lender to be
able to consistently identify or predict which of its borrowers are most likely to be charged
with CERCLA liability? This identification problem is magnified by the fact that innocent
borrowers, once they become landowners, may be charged with CERCLA liability for the
pollution sins of prior landowners. This type of liability is almost impossible to foresee unless
a lender conducts a comprehensive examination of the owner and usage history of the facility
to be purchased by the borrower.
116. This decline occurs because the cost of capital and interest rates are directly related,
while interest rates and the demand for capital are inversely related. The magnitude of the
decline in the demand for capital depends on the elasticity level of the capital market. See R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 365-67 (1977). Under either a Keynesian or
monetarist economic framework, interest rate volatility affects the level of investment on a
macroeconomic level. When interest rates rise, reflecting the increasing cost of capital,
investment spending declines. See W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICY 242-43 (1979).
117. See supra note 116.
118. See W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, supra note 116, at 242-43.
119. Id.
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In addition to the macroeconomic spillover effects that may be
created if lenders are liable under section 107(a)(1), microeconomic
implications exist as well. Because mortgagors found liable under
CERCLA for the high cleanup costs of hazardous waste releases will
often become insolvent and default on their loans, commercial lenders
will increasingly face a difficult dilemma: foreclose and face CERCLA liability, or elect not to foreclose to escape CERCLA liability
and lose the value of their security interest. Because, in most cases,
CERCLA liability is preferable to losing a security interest altogether,
the normal foreclosure rate will likely increase as a result of the CERCLA liability imposed on mortgagors. Mortgagees therefore will
increasingly bear the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites that
they had no part in creating-costs that potentially can exceed the
amount of the lender's original loan."E°
The increased risks lenders will incur in property loan transactions will likely be manifested in the form of increased interest rates or
the amount of points a lender charges a borrower up front in a property loan transaction. Additionally, section 107(a)(1)'s imposition of
strict liability on owners and operators of land may impede the free
transferability of loans in the secondary mortgage market; another
unintended economic spillover effect resulting from lenders getting
caught in CERCLA's expansive web of strict liability. Finally, and
perhaps most dangerous, the section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner
affirmative defense may create an incentive for lenders about to foreclose on their security interest to look for, but not find, hazardous
waste on the property; because finding a release prior to acquisition of
the property is tantamount to forfeiting any chance of using the innocent landowner affirmative defense to escape section 107(a)(1)
liability.
B.

The Deputization of Banks as Involuntary EPA Monitors

CERCLA, by imposing liability on lenders, effectually deputizes
banks as quasi-EPA monitors.12 1 The purpose of conscripting the
commercial lending industry as an involuntary appendage of the
EPA's enforcement arm is to force banks to investigate the ownership
and usage history of property before obtaining a security interest in
120. One of the most significant aspects of banker liability under CERCLA is the fact that
lenders can be held liable for amounts exceeding the amount of the original loan. Normally,
when a lender enters into a commercial loan transaction, its risk is limited to the amount of the
loan.
121. Telephone interview with Robert Norris, Legislative Assistant to Congressman Barney
Frank (Nov. 14, 1986).
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the property. 122 By disallowing the section 107(b)(3) defense to owners or operators of land who have constructive notice of actual or
threatened hazardous substance releases, CERCLA induces lenders to
act as watchdogs over their security interests to prevent hazardous
substance releases before they occur. Thus, the potential liability
forces lenders to police land transfer transactions to ensure that prop123
erty is not transferred with hidden hazardous waste problems.
This "banker beware" policy presupposes that lenders are in a
position to effectively monitor thousands of parcels of property held
as security interests. It envisions lenders being able to exercise strict
scrutiny of every parcel held as security for a loan. Such a vision is
both unfounded and unrealistic. Practical limitations abound that
preclude lenders from effectively implementing a comprehensive,
national monitoring program to protect their security interests from
hazardous substance contamination.
The impediments to an effective national monitoring program
range from economic impracticability to legally instituted disincentives. First, for banks to conduct environmental inspections on
every parcel of land held as a security interest is a costly economic
undertaking in and of itself; but to effectively protect itself from CERCLA liability, the commercial lending industry must do even
more. It must maintain a national program to monitor all landed
security interests for the entire repayment period of all outstanding
loans. Moreover, commercial lenders are simply not in a position,
practically or economically, to bear the type of monitoring implicitly
required by CERCLA's imposition of strict liability on landowners.
Even if a comprehensive national monitoring program was an
economically feasible undertaking for commercial lenders, CERCLA
strongly discourages them from ardently serving as environmental
monitors. By eliminating the availability of the innocent landowner
affirmative defense to parties with actual or constructive knowledge of
potential hazardous waste releases, CERCLA has created a strong
disincentive for lenders to seek out and find hazardous waste
problems. This is because once lenders discover hazardous waste on
their landed security interest, they lose the innocent landowner
defense of section 107(b)(3).' 2 4 Consequently, sections 101(35)(A), 2 5
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Merely monitoring land held as a security interest is inadequate to protect lenders
from liability because a lender who discovers that hazardous waste is being disposed of on its
landed security is effectually precluded from raising the innocent landowner affirmative
defense. See supra note 93.
125. See supra note 90.
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(B), 126 and 107(b)(3) 127 create an incentive for lenders to look for, but

not find hazardous waste.
C.

The "PolluterPays" Principle v. DistributedSocietal Costs

When the Superfund was created in 1980, Congress funded it primarily from excise taxes levied on the petroleum and chemical industries.' 28 Congress levied those taxes, essentially pollution excise
taxes,'29 specifically on those two industries because it believed there
was a reasonable nexus between their activities and the production of
hazardous substances. 30 Predominantly following the "polluter
pays" principle, Congress fashioned the Superfund so that parties
responsible for producing hazardous substances bore the brunt of the
removal and cleanup costs.' 3
In 1986, however, Congress decided that to finance the substantial increase in the Superfund, it would broaden the Superfund tax
base beyond merely the chemical and petroleum industries. 3 2 Such
a change in policy reflected the Senate Finance Committee's view that
"the clean-up of abandoned hazardous waste sites is a broad societal
problem extending beyond the chemical and petroleum industries."' 33
Consequently, SARA drew on other sources to replenish the
Superfund with $8.5 billion over five years. 34 The Superfund is currently subsidized as follows: 30% from a tax on petroleum, 30%
from a tax on raw chemicals, 15% from general revenues, 3 3.5%
126. See supra notes 93, 108 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
128. S.REP. No. 73, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985).

129. Excise taxes tax the consumption of certain goods. Their primary function is usually
not to raise revenue per se, but to either deter the consumption of certain goods or to
internalize the cost of externalities. Lecture by Professor William Kelso, University of Florida
(Sept. 27, 1984). In a market economy, competition among the conflicting forces of supply
and demand normally causes prices of goods to reflect their true market values. Sometimes,

however, the production or consumption of a good causes an economic spillover effect, which
is not reflected in the cost of that good. Pollution is an example of a negative spillover effect
associated with the manufacturing process of many goods. It is harmful to both health and the
environment, and its cleanup poses a cost to society. Because the cost of pollution produced in
the manufacturing of a particular good usually is not reflected in the market price of that good,
overconsumption results. To counter this result, government may internalize the true cost of
the good through the imposition of an excise tax. Id. In the case of the Superfund, which is

largely subsidized by excise taxes imposed on the chemical and petroleum industries, Congress
has opted to internalize the costs of hazardous waste by taxing the principal producers.
130. The petroleum and chemical industries produce over 65% of the hazardous waste in
this country every year. See C. REVELLE & P. REVELLE, THE ENVIRONMENT 617 (1984)
131. S. REP. No. 73, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985); see supra note 3.
132. Id.

133. Id.
134. CONG. Q., Oct. 11, 1986, at 2540, col. 1.
135. Id. The fact that Congress decided to subsidize the Superfund, at least in part, with
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from interest, and 3.5% from government recoveries of cleanup costs
from responsible parties. 136 Thus, under the 1986 Amendments to
Superfund, CERCLA's philosophy of recovery has changed from one
of strict adherence to the "polluter pays" principle 37 to a slightly
more liberal version, incorporating some generalized apportioning of
38
societal costs among a broader range of parties.
Nevertheless, the liability of commercial lenders under CERCLA is difficult to justify under either philosophy of recovery. Under the "polluter pays" principle, it is impossible to justify
the imposition of hazardous waste liability on a particular group of
persons that may not be in any way responsible for the production of
hazardous waste. Because commercial lenders are not producers of
hazardous waste, it is logically inconsistent with the "polluter pays"
principle to charge them with the financial responsibility of cleaning
up such waste. The commercial lending industry simply is not similar
to, and should not be treated the same as, the petroleum and chemical
industries, which together produce the vast majority of the hazardous
waste in this country.
CERCLA's imposition of strict liability on "owners or operators
of a facility" potentially results in the commercial lending industry
incurring specific economic costs for a broad-based societal problem.
Congress, perhaps believing that banks are in a position to effectively
police land transactions, has ultimately placed much of the onus of
hazardous waste liability on commercial lenders who become owners
via foreclosure.' 39 Although the imposition of liability on potentially
4
innocent landowners may be rationalized on utilitarian grounds,1 0
general revenues, suggests that Congress has embraced the notion that hazardous waste is a
national problem whose costs should be borne or shared by a broad segment of society.
Conversely, the fact that Congress chose to apportion 60% of the cost of replenishing
Superfund to the chemical and petroleum industries, which together produce over 65% of this
nation's hazardous waste; strongly suggests that Congress remains loyal to the "polluter pays"
principle.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 3.
138. See H.R. CONF. REP. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 333-35 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3276, 3426-28.
139. Although bank lobbies attempted to persuade members of Congress to include in
section 101(35) of the 1986 Superfund amendments a provision exempting mortgagees from
liability when they acquire possession of land by foreclosure, members of the Senate were so
hostile to the idea that it was never even formally considered in committee. Telephone
interview with Robert Norris, Legislative Assistant to Congressman Barney Frank (Nov. 14,
1986).
140. A utilitarian justification for banker liability presupposes that imposing liability on
innocent lenders will actually reduce the hazardous waste problem enough to offset the
economic costs that accompany banker liability. Because imposing liability on banks raises the
cost of capital, Congress, though well-intentioned, has created an economic externality while
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the accomplishment of the greater good in promoting greater environmental protection, trying to justify such an imposition via the 'polluter pays" principle, is logically fallacious.
The current liability scheme imposed in section 107(a)(1) of
CERCLA stems from the philosophy that the production of hazardous waste is a broad societal problem 4 1 and the costs of dealing with
it should be generally apportioned among a wide range of parties.' 42
Imposing strict liability on owners of land containing an actual or
threatened hazardous waste release appears justifiable under the
notion of broadly apportioned societal costs. Such a broad scheme
of liability, however, is dysfunctional in that it creates a number of
damaging economic externalities and harmful disincentives that may
outweigh the utility of the expansive scheme of strict liability currently imposed by section 107(a)(1).
Additionally, strict liability of owners and operators of land
places a disproportionate share of the hazardous waste cleanup costs
on a class of potentially innocent parties. Such a disproportionate
assignment of hazardous waste liability contravenes the spirit of the
broadly distributed societal costs philosophy; a philosophy increasingly embraced by Congress. 14 3 If Congress truly desires to implement a policy of spreading hazardous waste cleanup costs broadly
among the American polity, it should increase the share of the
Superfund derived from general revenues. Further, Congress should
either provide an effective innocent landowner defense or do away
with section 107(a)(1)'s imposition of strict liability on owners and
operators of land. The present scheme of imposing strict liability on
owners and operators of land is consistent neither with the "polluter
pays" principle nor the notion of broadly distributed societal costs.
D. Mortgagee Liability: A Standard Practice
Although imposing liability on commercial lenders not involved
in the production of hazardous waste is difficult to justify in terms of
either economic or administrative efficiency, it is arguably consistent
with the traditional motgagor-mortgagee relationship. Section
107(a)(1) of CERCLA makes commercial lenders holding landed
security interests, who acquire ownership through foreclosure, financially responsible for any damage done to the land prior to foreclotrying to contain an environmental one. Such an externality negatively affects the economy
by increasing the cost of capital investment, which may impede economic growth, and by
retarding the free transferability of loans in the secondary mortgage market.
141. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. See S. REP. No. 73, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985); see also supra note 135.
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sure. If a mortgagor dumps hazardous waste on land held as a
security interest by a mortgagee, and then defaults on the mortgage,
the mortgagee, upon foreclosing, exposes itself to section 107(a)(1) liability. This scenario is analogous to situations where a mortgagee
forecloses on property that the mortgagor has negligently damaged in
some way. In both cases, the mortgagee can sue the mortgagor for
damages. 44 If the mortgagor is insolvent, however, the mortgagee
will ultimately bear the financial burden of the repair.
The fact that mortgagees may ultimately be responsible for damage done to their landed security interests by mortgagors is self-evident. 145 The only difference between mortgagee liability under
CERCLA and more traditional norms of mortgagee liability 146 is that
CERCLA deals with an environmental problem deemed so severe and
dangerous that the federal government has used its police power 1 47 to

mandate that owners of property clean up hazardous substances on
their land or reimburse the government for such cleanups. Generally, when a mortgagee forecloses on a security interest
and finds that its property has been damaged by the mortgagor, who
for some reason is judgment or execution-proof, the mortgagee has
the option of restoring the property to its previous value or electing to
do nothing and accepting the land in its depreciated
state. CERCLA takes away the latter option by statutorily compelling land owners to clean up hazardous waste releases or to reimburse
the EPA when the agency conducts its own cleanup. 4 Such a stat144. See, e.g., Jaffe-Spindler v. Genesco, Inc., 747 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1984) (person
possessing lien against real estate has right to restrain waste); In re Tremblay, 43 Bankr. 221
(D. Vt. 1984) (Under Vermont law, mortgagee may enjoin mortgagor from emitting waste that
will endanger mortgagee's security and may seek recompense for diminution of value of
security below amount of mortgage debt.).
145. Although mortgagees attempt to protect themselves in commercial loan transactions
by retaining security interests equal to or exceeding the value of the loans made to mortgagors,
they assume the risk that the value of their collateral may fall below the amount of the
outstanding loan to the mortgagor. If the mortgagor damages the mortgagee's landed security
interest, causing the market value of the property to fall, the mortgagee, by virtue of its interest
in the property, may bring an action against the mortgagor for damages. See supra note 144.
If the mortgagor is judgment or execution-proof, however, the mortgagee, if he ever acquires
ownership of the security interest via foreclosure, becomes responsible for the cost of restoring
the property to its original value.
146. See supra note 144.
147. The question of whether a federal police power actually exists is certainly beyond the

scope of this Comment. Suffice it to say for the purpose of this point that the commerce power
serves as a surrogate for the federal police power.
148. Congress legislated away a landowner's right to do nothing while a potential

hazardous substance release threatens his land. This usurpation of liberty was motivated by
the environmental and public health hazards resulting from the improper disposal of
hazardous waste. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md.

1986).
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utory scheme has its policy underpinnings rooted in the fact that hazardous waste, like all pollution, is an externality that lies beyond the
realm of market regulation thereby necessitating government intervention.1 49 A problem arises, however, when the government chooses
to intervene by imposing liability for hazardous waste pollution on a
potentially innocent group of nonpolluters; especially when such lia-

bility, imposed to curb one externality, is responsible for the unintended creation of others.
E. Alternative Schemes of Liability
Faced with a scheme of liability capable of holding innocent parties resposible for the cleanup costs of hazardous waste releases, Congress may need to amend CERCLA again to provide a statutory
framework capable of effectively and fairly dealing with the problem
of inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites. Alternative
schemes of hazardous waste liability could be fashioned to avoid
much of the unintended economic turbulence 50 caused by the present
scheme of strict liability imposed by CERCLA and SARA.
In 1986, the Freddie Mac banking lobby proposed an alternative
scheme of hazardous waste liability,' which would leave the main149. Pollution is conventionally viewed as a failure of the self-regulatory mechanisms of a
free market economy and, therefore, is an appropriate occasion for government regulation.
See R. POSNEP, supra note 116, at 271.
150. See supra notes 111-119 and accompanying text.
151. Under this scheme, commercial lenders who become owners or operators of land
would be absolved from section 107(a)(1) liability if they could establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the release or threat of release of the hazardous substance at issue, and the
damages resulting therefrom, were caused solely by:
[A]n act or omission of a third party, regardless of when it occurs, other than an
employee or agent of the defendant or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with
the defendant if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous
substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts and omissions;
provided that a land contract, deed, mortgage or deed of trust does not establish
a contractual relationship as referred to above if the real property on which the
facility is located was acquired by the defendant after the placement of the
hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and any of the following
circumstances are established by the defendant by a preponderance of the
evidence: (i) at the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the
subject of the release or threat of release was disposed of on, in or at the facility,
or (ii) if the defendant has acquired the facility by virtue of (a) taking possession
of the site as a mortgagee or other secured party, (b) foreclosing or accepting an
instrument in lieu of foreclosure, or (c) otherwise exercising its rights or remedies
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stay of the current statutory structure essentially intact while eliminating many of the negative economic spillover effects plaguing the
imposition of strict liability under section 107(a)(1).15
Under Freddie Mac's proposed scheme, CERCLA would be amended to absolve
from liability banks and other commercial lenders who become owners or operators of property as a direct result of their mortgagee relationship." 3 Lenders who enter into secured loan agreements
without having actual or constructive notice of an actual or
threatened hazardous waste release on the property to be held as
security would be exempt from section 107(a)(1) liability. The only
material difference between this scheme and the CERCLA scheme
currently in effect is that under CERCLA a lender who enters into a
secured commercial loan without actual or constructive knowledge of
hazardous waste on the landed security interest may still be strictly
liable under section 107(a)(1) if he discovers or should have discovered an actual or threatened release on the land prior to foreclosure.
Under Freddie Mac's proposed scheme, such an innocent lender
would be shielded from section 107(a)(1) liability. 54 The Freddie
Mac liability scheme, although not substantially divergent from the
status quo, would likely alleviate many of the harsh, yet unintended,
economic externalities and spillover effects created by the broad imposition of strict liability under section 107(a)(1). '
under the mortgage or other instrument, and at the time the defendant originated
or purchased the mortgage or other instrument, the defendant did not know and
had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the
release or threat of release was disposed of on, in or at the facility, or (iii) the
defendant acquired the facility by inheritance, bequest, or escheat, or through
any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent
domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
Proposed substitute for House amendment § 107(m) of SARA, formulated by Federal Home
Loan Corporation (Freddie Mac) (Summer 1986); Telephone interview with Jeanne Broyhill,
Legislative Director Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (Nov. 20, 1986).
152. See Proposed substitute for House amendment § 107(m) of SARA, supra note 151.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. One argument frequently used to oppose liability schemes creating broad innocent
landowner affirmative defenses is that they will result in nonpolluting purchasers who acquire
contaminated land at fire sale prices reaping windfall profits when the EPA cleans up the land,
thereby restoring its value. This argument rests on the notion that people should not be
rewarded when they buy contaminated land and then do nothing while the government
expends money and resources cleaning the land. This argument, however, is flawed for two
reasons. First, it presupposes that purchasers will be able to purchase contaminated land at
fire sale prices. If a site is known to be on an EPA cleanup list, this information will be
reflected in the market value of the property. Therefore, contaminated land, if it is targeted for
cleanup, will not likely be available at a fire sale price. Second, this argument is ineffective
against the liability scheme that Freddie Mac proposed because the proposed scheme does not
absolve from liability land purchasers who acquire ownership with knowledge of a hazardous
waste release on the property to be purchased, nor does it absolve from liability lenders who
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The imposition of CERCLA liability on parties who are in no
way responsible for the production or release of hazardous substances
seems both inherently unfair and a gross misapportionment of legal
responsibility. Although probing the underlying policy justifications
for such an imposition reveals a bold attempt by Congress to minimize the societal costs of a rampant hazardous waste problem, the
manner in which the amended Superfund Act will effectually conscript the commercial lending industry into the enforcement arm of
the EPA is economically and administratively impracticable.
Through the imposition of strict liability, CERCLA encourages the
commercial lending industry to take greater responsibility for their
landed security interests in an attempt to make environmental monitoring a standard practice in the industry. The systemic shortcomings
inherent in such a scheme, however, may cause banks to engage in a
dangerous game of "look, but don't find"; for finding hazardous waste
is rewarded with liability.' 5 6
The practical result of this policy is charging innocent landowners with liability for hazardous waste cleanup costs. Congress, to ease
the latent unfairness of this policy, has created an avenue by which
innocent landowners can attempt to escape or minimize liability-the
section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner affirmative defense. 5 7 The
stringent requirements necessary to invoke this defense, however,
undermine its ability to effectively protect innocent landowners from
section 107(a)(1)'s far-reaching imposition of strict liability.
The result of section 107(b)(3)'s failure to effectively restrict the
become owners via foreclosure, if at the time they purchased or originated the mortgage, they
knew or had reason to know of any actual or threatened release on the property.
156. An unintended result of this policy may actually be to create an economic inducement
for commercial lenders who discover hazardous waste on their landed security interests to try
to hide it to avoid relinquishing their innocent landowner defense. Reporting the discovery is
tantamount to admitting actual notice. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
157. A second, perhaps more attractive avenue to minimize liability under CERCLA is the
nonlitigation route of the de minimis settlement procedures under section 122(g). The
expeditious settlement of section 107 claims under section 122 of the 1986 Act may be
mutually beneficial to both the government and potentially liable parties because it minimizes
litigation costs. Further, the government may be willing to settle with potentially responsible
parties for a reasonable amount for the sake of expediting cleanup actions and the desire to
avoid lengthy litigation. Section 122's settlement procedures, however, are not a matter of
right, but are only discretionary. The EPA may, but is not compelled to, enter into settlement
proceedings with potentially liable parties. Section 122 has the potential to instill a sense of
fairness into an otherwise "shoot first, ask questions later" scheme of strict liability. Through

section 122, the EPA can fashion a response cost recovery scheme that facilitates expeditious
settlements to recover response costs, while providing a forum receptive to weighing the
mitigating circumstances of innocent third parties; a forum that the section 107(b)(3) innocent

landowner affirmative defense does not adequately provide.
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expansive reach of section 107(a)(1) is a well-intentioned statute calling on government to supplant the forces of market regulation in
order to regulate one externality; but in so doing, creates a scheme of
liability so broad as to cause an economic riptide responsible for the
creation of other externalities. At some point, increasing the scope
of hazardous waste liability under section 107(a)(1) ceases to result in
the greater good to society. Accordingly, SARA's narrowing effect
on the section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense has expanded the
breadth of section 107(a)(1)'s imposition of strict liability beyond the
point of diminishing returns.
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